This paperdraws on the experiences of the United States and European Community to speculate on the effects of agreements to integrate high and low income economies. The evidence suggests that reducing barriers to the flow of goods or resources will promote convergence, even among integrating countries with disparate incomes. Convergence may be slow, however, even when impediments to integration are significantly lowered. Institutional constraints can have substantial influence on economic growth and convergence, and the nature and effects of integration agreements will depend on the institutional environment in which they operate.
I. Introduction
In late 1993, negotiations that had lasted for more than seven years among 117 countries under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) culminated in an agreement to cut tariffs on industrial goods by an average ofmore than one-third, progressively liberalize trade in agricultural products, and extend GATT's purview to trade in services, traderelated investment measures and trade-related intellectual property rights. During these multilateral negotiations, major agreements to integrate the economies of smaller groups of countries, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the European Community's "1992," and the joining of the two Germanys, also occurred. Proposals to extend NAFTA throughout Central and South America and to expand the European Community (EC) beyond its twelve members continue to be put forward. An especially noteworthy feature of many recentproposed agreements is that they involve the integration of dissimilar economies, not only in terms of per capita incomes, but also of laws and standards governing economic activity.
By the terminology, "more integrated," we mean a reduction in transactions costs or other barriers to the flow of goods, services or resources between countries or between regions within a country) The view that integration promotes economic efficiency, and thereby leads to increased incomes and possibly permanently higher growth rates, often propels the negotiation of I In the context of international agreements, various levels of integration are possible. For example, a preferential trade agreement provides lower trade barriers among member nations than between the members and nonmembers. A free trade area reflects more integration because all barriers are removed on trade among members. A customs union takes this one step further by harmonizing trade barriers toward all nonmember countries. Next, a common market is a customs union with the additional feature of no restrictions on the movement of labor and capital among members. Finally, an economic union goes even further by harmonizing or even unifying monetary and fiscal policies of members. A common currency would exist in the most advanced stage of economic union.
agreements to bring about increased integration. 2
The reduction of barriers to the movement of goods, services, and resources that promotes economic integration by narrowing price differentials internationally will cause changes in relative prices that alter the distribution of incomes both within and between nations.
Integration agreements are thus hard to achieve because some individuals will benefit while others are harmed. 3 Not surprisingly, economic theory provides no definitive answers about how the reductions of such barriers will affect the distribution of incomes between newly integrated economies, and the effects of increasing integration between low and high income countries could be particularly dramatic. One such scenario, labeled "social dumping," suggests that for many residents of industrial countries increased integration with the labor abundant developing countries will lead to a decline in wages and labor standards to the levels prevailing in the developing countries. This occurs as firms in industrial countries relocate production to developing countries to take advantage of lower wages and labor standards.
In a simple, neoclassical-type economy, an increased mobility of goods, services, and resources, would produce less income inequality among regions. Such a model, however, might not adequately capture the effects of integration. Endogenous growth models~ddress some of the shortcomings ofneoclassical growth models, and may explain better the experiences of some countries. In these models, per capita incomes may, but need not, converge. 4 A related point, emphasized by North (1994) , is that economic performance over time is fundamentally guided by a country's institutions. This implies that the effect on domestic growth of the removal of barriers to the flow of goods or resources between countries will depend on the set of 2 Much empirical evidence supports the conclusion that open economies tend to grow faster than closed economies. See Gould and Ruffin (1 993b) for a brief review of some empirical studies establishing that protectionist policies affect growth adversely.
3 Collins (1993) argues that distributional issues will prove to be a major impediment to achievement of further economic integration agreements. These issues could also explain why complex agreements that on balance promote integration may contain features that are contrary to integration. Gruben and Welch (1994) argue that NAFTA is not an unambiguous move toward closer economic integration. Even though NAFTA liberalizes trade in some sectors, particularly in many goods and some service sectors, it also increases protection in autos and textiles. In addition, NAFTA increases the number of trade restrictions that could be used to address complaints about differential environmental and workplace regulations.
institutions, both economic and political, that remain.
The effects ofdomestic institutions, as well as unsettled questions about the appropriate model and determinants of economic growth, make extrapolation from the experience of one country to another difficult. Nevertheless, we attempt to use the experiences of the United States and European Community to speculate on the effects of ongoing and future agreements to integrate economies, particularly those of high and low income countries. Many previous studies have measured the extent of income convergence between countries and among regions within countries. 5 Here, we draw on this literature to provide a standard of comparison for the present extent of income inequality between NAFTA members and potential members. Further, we attempt to draw general conclusions or lessons about the extent and pace of income convergence from the U.S. and EC experiences. Our review of these experiences leads us to five such conclusions: 1) the reduction of bamers to the flows of goods, services and resources produces a tendency for convergence of incomes in the long-run; 2) convergence can occur despite wide initial income differences; 3) convergence is likely to be slow, and punctuated by periods of income divergence; 4) various "non-economic" barriers can hinder the tendency for incomes to converge, and changes in these institutional barriers can affect the pace of convergence; and 5) conflicts between regions or integrated countries are likely to arise, and a federal system can assist in their resolution. Sections II and III review the histories of regional income inequality and convergence in the United States and European Community. We highlight the influence of political and other institutional changes on economic integration and the dispersion of regional incomes over time. Section IV presents our conclusions.
II. The U.S. Experience
The adoption of the Constitution in 1789 eliminated tariffs within the United States.
Although states have imposed various non-tariff barriers to interstate commerce, particularly in services, trade and the flow of resources between states have been relatively unfettered. 6 Differences in state per capita incomes have persisted over time, however. Even now, per capita 5 For recent examples, see Barro (1991) , Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) , Baumol, Blackman, and Wolff (1991) , Ben-David (1993) , Williamson (1992) , and Williamson and Lindert (1980). 6 O'Driscoll (1993) describes non-tariff barriers imposed by states on interstate commerce. incomes, at least in nominal terms, remain persistently lower in some states than in others. 7
Despite continued inequality of incomes across states, the U.S. experience, at least over the past century, has been one of regional income convergence. Easterlin (1957, 1960) provides estimates ofstate and regional per capita incomes for 1840, and better estimates for 1880, 1900 and 1920 that are more comparable with those for recent years. The Department of Commerce has produced annual state per capita income estimates for each year beginning in 1929. As Barro and S ala-i-Martin (1991) and others have shown, since 1880, the per capita incomes of U.S. states have tended to converge. Although convergence has been the norm, the pace of convergence has varied and at times state per capita incomes have diverged.
US. Income D~fferentia1sat the "Beginning"
One purpose of this study is to assess the size of per capita income differentials at early stages of integration, as well as their progression over time. We begin by reviewing Easterlin's figures for the United States in 1840 and 1880, the first years for which state or regional income estimates exist. Table 1 reproduces figures in Easterlin (1961, Table 1 ). In 1840, the West South Central region, at 144 percent of the national level, the Middle Atlantic region, at 136 percent, and New England, at 132 percent, had the highest per capita incomes, while the North Central, the South Atlantic and East South Central had relatively low per capita incomes. 8
Although of similar income, the North Central and the South were, of course, different in many ways. The North Central was the frontier, and population was low. Iowa had the nation's lowest per capita income, at just 58 percent of the national average, but its recent settlement and small population make it unclear how meaningful that estimate is. The South, on the other hand, was an established agricultural region where the per capita income of the white population was close 7 There are no official statistics on state cost-of-living, though Ram (1992) estimates that per capita incomes adjusted for differences in cost-of-living are now approximately equal across states. Williamson and Lindert (1980, pp. 127-30) show that historically, regions with low nominal income also have had relatively low cost-of-living, and hence that differencesin nominal income overstate differences in real income. Given the lack of reliable historical data on differences in cost-of-living, however, we follow most previous studies in focusing on differences in nominal incomes.
to that of the Northeast. 9
Much happened between 1840 and 1880. The West and Pacific Coast were opened and the Civil War was fought. In 1880, Mountain state per capita income was 168 percent of the national average, and that of the Pacific states more than double the national average. Easterlin (1961, p. 42) attributes the comparatively high per capita income of the West to a relatively large share of income derived from mining (and low share from agriculture) and to a worker to dependent ratio that was 40 percent higher than in the rest of the nation. Using data that are comparable to those for later years, U.S. per capita income was $175 in 1880.
At just $64, the per capita income ofNorth Carolina was the nation's lowest, being 38 percent of the national average. For lessons about the integration of high and low-income regions from the 9 Easterlin's (1960) income estimates for the South include the slave population, but he reports that if slaves and their subsistence incomes are omitted, the per capita income of whites exceeded the national average and was on par with the Northeast. 10 Easterlin's (1960) income estimates for 1840 are less inclusive than those for later years. For 1880, he produced two sets of estimates, one comparable with the I 840 numbers and one comparable with those for later years.
11 Irwin (1994) argues that an important cause of the decline in southern per capita income was a decline in the productivity of southern agriculture produced by the shift from gang labor to sharecropping on plantations. Other recent, and more general, studies of the effects ofthe Civil War on the South include Ransom (1989) and Wright (1986) . U.S. experience, therefore, we look primarily to the integration ofthe southern economy with that of the rest of the United States.
Income Convergence in the United States since 1840
This section reviews the course of income convergence across the states, highlighting the contribution of different regions to convergence in various decades. One measure of the dispersion of per capita incomes is the coefficient of variation (cv), which we report for various years in Table 2 As a region, the South did grow rapidly between 1900 and 1920, which contributed to per capita income convergence among all states. All southern states experienced income increases exceeding the national average, led by North Carolina, whose nominal per capita income rose nearly five-fold, from $72 to $354. By contrast, U.S. per capita income rose from $203 to $658. It seems likely that much of the relative gains by the South came as a result of the World War I agricultural boom. For the United States as a whole, the ratio of farm to non-farm income was 50 percent higher in 1918 than it had been before the war and agriculture produced a comparatively largepart of state incomes in the South. 13
As the data in Table 2 Table 2 show, this is 13 Annual figures for the ratio of farm to non-farm income are from Johnson (1973/74, p. 177 ).
14 An index of wholesale commodity prices which peaked at 167 (1923-25=100) in June 1920, plunged to 114 in January 1921, and had fallen to 91 by January 1922 (Board ofGovernors ofthe Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1937, p. 174 ). An index of the ratio offarm to non-farm income fell from 152 in 1918 to 59 in 1921 (1910-14=100) . also true of the comparison of 1919-21 with 1929. Wheelock and Coughlin (1993) examine the dispersion of Leven's (1925) Wheelock and Coughlin (1993) show, moreover, that relatively rapid growth in northeastern manufacturing states, rather than slow growth in agricultural states, explains any remaining divergence of state per capita incomes after 1921.'6 Regardless of whether or not there was convergence or divergence during the 1920s, the World War I boom and subsequent collapse illustrates how shifts in world demand patterns can affect income distribution between regions within a country (or between countries). Commodity-producing regions, like the South and Midwest had relatively rapid income growth when the demand for their output was high, but suffered sharply lower incomes when demand fell. Because the South and Midwest began the period with relatively low per capita incomes, the boom period generated convergence, while the subsequent decline generated divergence.
As during 1919-21, the first three years of the Great Depression brought increased dispersion of state per capita incomes, with dispersion largest in 1932. Since then, incomes have tended to converge. Figure 1 plots the coefficient of variation for annual state per capita income data for 1929-92. In addition to the cv for all states, we plot the cv after excluding states in the East and in the South.' 7 By 1940, the convergence of state per capita incomes that began in 1933 15 Leven produced two income measures, a "current" income measure, for which we report the cv in the text, and a "total" income measure. For the latter, the cv in 1919, 1920 and 1921 are .290, .315 and .412 , with a mean of .312. Thus, by this measure, there was per capita income convergence between 1921 and 1929. Leven reports that the "current" income measure is probably more accurate, however, and it appears that Easterlin derived his estimates from this measure.
16 Farm incomes generally rose from 1922 to 1929, as did the ratio of farm to non-farm income. Nevertheless, land values declined, and farm and bank failures reached unprecedented high numbers. Johnson (1973/74) contends that expectations of continued high output prices after the war that proved too optimistic ex post explain the paradox of falling land values, high numbers of bank and farm failures, and rising farm incomes during the I 920s. Alston (1983) and Alston, Grove and Wheelock (1994) 18 See Coughlin and Mandelbaum (1988) .
Institutional Constraints to Convergence
One indicator of convergence is the extent to which states with relatively low initial incomes grow faster over time than those with high initial incomes. Figures 2 and 3 plot state per capita income growth rates against initial income levels for 1880-1929 and for 1945-1992. In both periods, a negative relationship between initial per capita income levels and subsequent growth is evident. In the earlier period, however, the relationship is dominated by six western states with high initial per capita incomes and slow subsequent growth.' 9 If these states are omitted, the estimate of the relationship between 1880-1929 growth and 1880 per capita income is halved. 20 As a group, the 10 states with the lowest incomes, all of which were in the South, grew only slightly faster than the average state growth rate.
Before World War II, the pace of convergence between southern and non-southern per capita incomes was slow and interrupted, but the rapid growth of southern per capita income during World War II, and since 1950, has all but eliminated the gap between the North and the South (see Figure 4) . In 1880, the per capita income of 12 southern states was just 50 percent of U.S. per capita income. In 1900, those states had a per capita income of 48 percent of the U.S. The most far-reaching explanation is put forward by Gavin Wright (1986) "informal channels" to the North, southerners contemplating emigration to the North faced overwhelmingly uncertain prospects. Migration was not constrained by formal institutional barriers, but rather by cultural and, in the case of blacks, racial barriers. Until the initial emigrants broke these barriers, the flow of labor was insufficient to bring about wage and income equality between the regions. 21 Wright (1986) Wright argues that New Deal legislation played an important role in ending the isolation of the southern labor market, first by raising southern wage rates toward the national norm and, more importantly, by weakening some of the institutional barriers that had prevented economic integration. While the federal legislation raised southern wages, it also produced widespread unemployment. The lack ofjobs for unskilled labor in agriculture or industry left large numbers of people with no reason to stay in the South. 22 World War II pulled many people out of the 21 An alternative explanation for the isolationof the southern labor market is put forward by Margo (1993) , who argues that a lack of education, especially for blacks, inhibited migration from the South. 22 Wright's view is somewhat contradicted by Wallis' (1989) newly-constructed state-level nonagricultural employment indices for the 1 930s, which show that southern employment recovered more rapidly after region and into northern factories. In addition, Wright contends that elimination of the southern industrial wage advantage and the decline of farm tenancy removed the incentive for southern political and economic interests to protect the region's isolation.
After the war, the South began to adopt policies to promote integration of the region with the rest of the country. To a large extent, income convergence was promoted by the emigration of millions of low income individuals and families. Southern states and municipalities, however, also adopted policies to promote inflows of capital and high-skill labor, including favorable tax laws and abatements, cheap land for plant construction, inexpensive utilities and improved schools. An important example of how the South had changed was the willingness of many white southerners to accept civil rights for blacks because it was now in their economic interests to do so.
Some of Wright's description of the path by which the South became integrated with the rest of the United States has been questioned. 23 Moreover, Margo (1993) shows that the pace of convergence between southern per capita income and the per capita income of the rest of the United States was not markedly slower than the convergence of low income midwestern states and the Northeast. Margo does not, however, deny the importance of the institutional barriers affecting the speed or extent to which the southern economy became integrated with the remainder ofthe United States. Such barriers included poor schools and the rejection of outside interference by the region's economic and political leaders who desired to retain their poo1 of low-wage unskilled labor.
Northern business and labor organizations were also concerned about the lower wages and labor standards that prevailed in the South. A relocation of manufacturingjobs from the Northeast, a region with high wages and labor standards, to the South in the early l900s raised the concerns of labor that job relocation would force down northern wages. At the same time, northern manufacturers worried that low wages gave southern firms a cost advantage. These concerns were translated into a move to harmonize labor standards throughout the country. As 1933 than did employment in the rest ofthe nation.
23 See Alston (1987) and Margo (1993) , for example. early as 1892 a congressional committee investigating sweatshops recommended that they be subject to federal laws rather than differing state laws. The harmonization of labor standards in the United States proceeded slowly, however, because states were reluctant to cede their rights to establish their own labor rules and regulations. It was not until the Fair Labor Standards Act, which was motivated by a desire to establish common minimum standards to slow the relocation ofjobs, that a major harmonization of labor standards occurred.
Contentious issues involving labor are common in integration efforts, especially those involving high and low-income areas. 24 A concern of high-income areas, and especially the lowskilled workers in those regions, is that relocation ofjobs will force wages and labor standards to decline to the level prevailing in the low-income areas. The concern over "social dumping" associated with relocation of manufacturingjobs from the North to the South continues to prevail within the United States and, as discussed below, has also been an issue within the European Community and was particularly important in the negotiation of NAFTA.
Government Policies and Post-WarIncome Convergence
The federal policies affecting state per capita income convergence during the 1 93Os were largely regulatory, but as the Federal Government's share of total economic activity has grown, the potential impact of federal fiscal actions has increased. Not surprisingly, regional interests have, in the name of "equity," pushed for federal fiscal policies that would benefit their regional economic development. Operationally, these groups want the net flow of funds from the Federal Government, which is usually calculated as a ratio of a state's share of total federal expenditures to its share of total payments made to the Federal Government, to increase. 25
Since World War II, federal taxation and spending have been linked to regional disparities in income levels and growth. In the United States a substantial portion of adverse income shocks suffered by a region are offset automatically. Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1991) show that a $1 decline in a region's per capita personal income is partially offset by a 34 cent 24 See Collins (1993) .
25 In our discussion we focus on the flow of funds to assess federal influence on economic activity and inequality at the state level. Another approach is to attribute business cycles to the Federal Government and then examine state (regional) performance during differentphases of the business cycle. See Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1980) for such an analysis. decline in federal taxes and a 6 cent increase in federal transfers. Coughlin and Mandelbaum (1989) show that federal taxes and transfers have not affected the pace of per capita income convergence over time, but since they are applied similarly across all states, these policies reduce the degree of inequality across states.
During the 1970s it was argued that federal spending had been biased in favor of the Sun Belt at the expense of the Frost Belt, resulting in relatively more rapid growth in the Sun Belt. In fact, federal revenue and expenditure patterns have favored the Sun Belt for many years. 26
Between 1952 and the mid-i 970s, states located in the Southeast, Southwest, Far West and Rocky Mountains generally had flow-of-funds ratios exceeding one, while states in the Great Lakes, Mideast and New England regions generally had flows-of-funds ratios less than one.
Overtime, the differences across regions have narrowed.
Researchers have argued that federal fiscal policies contributed to increasing inequality in the i980s by shifting the distribution of grants-in aid and procurement toward the New England and Mid-Atlantic regions. 27 Such redistribution could potentially increase income inequality by stimulating growth in relatively high-income states at the expense of growth in low-income states. Coughlin and Mandelbaum (1989) find little empirical support for this view, however, except that changes in defense spending appear to have contributed to increased inequality.
Federal policies have sometimes been used to alleviate the adverse consequences of increased international integration. For example, the U.S. Trade Adjustment Act of 1962 contained a formal procedure for compensating those affected adversely by international trade.
The underlying rationale was that a portion of the benefits from freer trade that accrue to the rest of society should be used to assist displaced workers acquire new skills to speed their reemployment. The output gains from freer trade require factors to move, and trade adjustment assistance can ease the transition of workers out of shrinking firms and industries. Similarly, the assistance can cushion the effects suffered by regions from significant import competition. 26 See Table 31 of Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1980) for estimates of federal flows-of-funds ratios for states and regions for 1952, 1959-61, 1965-67, 1969-71 and 1974-76. 27 See Weinstein and Wigley (1987) and Gross and Weinstein (1988) .
Because of its theoretical appeal, trade adjustment assistance will likely figure prominently in future U.S. integration negotiations. To date, however, such assistance has largely failed to fulfill its promise. 28 The original legislation allowed compensation for retraining, job relocation and supplements to unemployment insurance. The program, which was initially administered by the U.S. Tariff Commission, allowed for compensation only when it was possible to demonstrate that damage to workers or firms was due primarily to reductions in 
Historical Background
This section reviews major steps taken by European countries toward economic integration. Table 3 identifies some of the developments in this process. The European Community dates from 1957, when the Treaty of Rome was signed by Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany. The goal ofthe six founding countries was to create an integrated "Common Market" within which goods, services, labor and capital would 28 See Lawrence and Litan (1986) for a review. move without any differential governmental regulation. Such an environment was expected to allow all members to realize higher levels of economic well-being. In its early years, the implementation of the Treaty of Rome focused on eliminating tariffs among the member countries. A particularly noteworthy event, which will be discussed further later, was the start in 1962 of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). By 1968 the EC had become a customs union.
During these early years, barriers affecting capital movements and trade in services were neglected, while those affecting labor mobility were greatly reduced but not eliminated.
Progress toward a more closely integrated BC has not been continuous. Slow economic growth in the 1 970s and early 1 980s, termed Eurosclerosis, resulted in attempts by EC members to protect their domestic industries from competition from other member countries. 29
Government regulations and standards were imposed on numerous products, including such minutiae as noise limits on lawn mowers and controls on the wheat content of pasta. Localcontent rules distorted production decisions by requiring a minimum amount of local goods in finished products. Public procurement programs and aid to specific firms and industries also multiplied, moving the BC toward disintegration rather than integration. Cost-increasing barriers involve delays at customs posts and technical regulations relating to production, packaging, and marketing. Customs delays are caused by differences in 29 See Boucher (1991) for additional details. laws and regulations between member states as well as by the collection of statistics, and to combat terrorism and drug trafficking. In January 1988 the EC reduced the paper work for truck drivers to a single document where previously up to 100 documents could have been required for a single trip between two member states.
Market-entry restrictions include government-procurement restrictions, the right of establishment for various service industries and professions, restrictions in some service sectors, such as insurance and electricity, that prevent or limit trading across frontiers, and restrictions on entry into regulated markets, such as civil aviation. While cost-increasing barriers, if not set prohibitively high, allow competition, market-entry restrictions preclude competition.
Price controls and specific taxes may also distort intra-Community trade. To offset the effects of widely different indirect tax rates, including excise and value-added rates, tax adjustments are sometimes made at borders to ensure that imported goods are taxed like domestically-produced goods. The White Paper also encouraged the broader use of the Community's competition policy to alleviate market-distorting subsidies and practices as well as market power abuses by dominant firms.
The deepening of the BC has also involved the financial sector, with the process of forming a common currency area especially noteworthy. 3°I n 1970 BC authorities received the Werner Report, which advocated the formation of a monetary union to propel complete economic and political integration. The BC has tried to limit the flexibility of foreign exchange rates among member nations with the ultimate goal of establishing a common currency. The European snake, which attempted to stabilize European exchange rates, was the first step in this process. In March 1972 the members agreed to maintain the values of their currencies within a narrow band of values around a parity rate.
The snake was short-lived. High inflation left the United Kingdom, Italy and France unable, or unwilling, to defend their currencies, and by the mid-1970s much of Europe was operating on a system of flexible exchange rates. Concern about the size of exchange rate movements prompted renewed efforts to return to fixed exchange rates, and the European 30 For additional details on early European efforts at monetary integration, see Hodgson and Herander (1983) .
Monetary System (EMS) was formed in March 1979. The principal feature of the EMS was the establishment of central exchange rates, around which currency values were permitted to fluctuate. The central rates were to be reviewed periodically and could be adjusted with changes in fundamentals.
The agreement establishing the EMS also created the European Currency Unit (ECU). Continued pressure on weaker currencies led to suspension of the agreement in August 1993, when the bilateral bands were widened from ±2.25 percent to ±15 percent for all rates except the guilder/deutsche mark rate.
Despite the difficulties encountered in operating the EMS, BC members have continued to discuss and reach agreements furthering monetary and political union. The European Union, which came into force in 1993 after ratification of the Maastricht Summit Accords, includes the eventual establishment of a single currency and the framing of a common defense policy. This treaty sets a course for Europe for many years ahead, though the precise direction is debated.
Proponents of a federal Europe say that the treaty contains the essential elements of a future European government: a single currency, a common foreign and defense policy, a common citizenship, and a parliament with power, in essence, a "United States of Europe." On the other hand, some view the treaty as simply helping the EC formulate foreign policies to deal with 31 See Zurlinden (1993) for a thorough description of this episode as it pertains to the pound. developments in Eastern Europe and creating a more efficient market through a single currency.
Income Inequality in the EC
Judging the consequences of integration on income inequality among EC countries is complicated, first because integration has progressed discontinuously and at times has regressed, and second because membership in the BC has grown over time. The United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland joined in 1973 , Greece in 1981 , and Spain and Portugal in 1986 . The three most recent members are relatively low income countries and, especially for Spain and Portugal, the short period of their membership provides few observations to assess their relative performance.
Our analysis begins by examining the path of income inequality for the original members of the BC. Figure 5 , which is based on Summers and Heston's (1991) adjustments of real per capita gross domestic product using purchasing power parity, shows a convergence between 1950 and 1980; however, during the 1980s the path is best characterized as one of divergence. While far from definitive, an argument can be made that declining inequality was associated with increasing integration. 32 Tariffs were reduced significantly during the first ten years of the BC, and by 1968 the BC had become a customs union. Inequality declined substantially in this period. From the late 1960s to the late i970s, however, the degree of inequality declined, at most, slightly, as the imposition of non-tariffbarriers deterred intra-EC trade. In the 1 980s, similar to the U.S. experience, inequality increased.
The entry of countries into the BC also provides suggestive evidence that integration reduces inequality. Figure 7) . Since joining the BC, Greekper capita gross domestic product has declined relative to the mean of the original members, which is an exception to the evidence presented so far.
The per capita gross domestic product ofthe remaining BC members --Portugal and Spain --were 42 and 62 percent of the mean of the original members when they joined in 1986.
Both countries experienced relative per capita gross domestic product gains during the I960s through 1974, but then declined relative to the original members until 1986. Since joining the BC, Portugal and Spain have each had per capita gross domestic product gains relative to the original six. Consequently, the evidence for these two countries suggests that integration has reduced inequality. 34
Government Policy and Inequality
In the United States the Federal Government plays a role in ameliorating the consequences of adverse regional income shocks. Recall that Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1991) estimated that a one dollar reduction in a region's per capita personal income automatically 34 While we focus on individual countries, Neven and Gouyette (1993) assess convergence in per capita output across regions in the EC during 1975-90. They find major differences in the pattern of convergence across sub-periods and across subsets of regions. For example, since the mid-1980s, the regions in the north of Europe have tended to converge, while those in the south have tended to diverge. The authors concludes that this indicates that trade liberalization can exacerbate regional disparities. triggers a decrease in federal taxes ofabout 34 cents and an increase in federal transfers of about 6 cents. Such a system does not operate to a significant degree in the EC. Sala-i-Martin and Sachs estimate that a one dollar adverse shock reduces tax payments to the BC of approximately one-half cent.
Economic and social cohesion is, however, a major objective of the BC. To further cohesion the BC pursues policies "to give every citizen an equal chance of enjoying the benefits of economic integration." 35 Especially noteworthy is that the redistribution associated with this objective is handled through a supra-national organization, and is reflected in the Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund components of the BC budget. Resources are transferred from the relatively wealthy members --Germany, the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands --in the heartland of Europe to the relatively poor countries on the periphery to bring the latter's income closer to the BC average and make them more attractive as locations for economic activity.
A major recipient of BC transfers has been Greece, and the decline in its per capita income relative to other BC members since 1981 cannot be attributed to a lack of aid. BC funding for Greece amounts to six percent of the country's national income. 36 The poor performance of the Greekeconomy might instead be institutional. The country's fiscal system is in disarray. In 1993, the Greek government budget deficit was 11 percent of GDP, with funds for development projects diverted to finance current government expenditures. The Greek government also continues to support state-owned enterprise, such as airlines and shipbuilding, that are heavily indebted and said to be exceptionally inefficient.
For present purposes it is not essential to assess the overall effectiveness of BC transfers in stimulating growth. 37 The key point is that politicians view these transfers as important 35 Commission of the European Communities (1994, p. 137) .
36 See Moseley (1994) . 37 A recent article by Gardner (1994) makes the following tentative conclusions. First, the projects and programs supported by the transfers are ofhigh quality. Second, the fact that national and regional governments must match EC funds in varying proportions provides some pressure to avoid wasteful spending. Third, firms in donor countries are frequently awarded contracts to carry out the funded projects in the recipient countries. The policy debate on the effectiveness of regional policy remains unsettled, however. See Neven and Gouyette (1993) for selected references on both sides of the issue. support for the integration process, and recent BC budgetary decisions suggest that they will play an increasing role in the BC. Decisions by the Edinburgh European Council mean that Structural Funds expenditures for 1994-99 will exceed ECU 140 billion and Cohesion Fund expenditures will equal ECU 15 billion, which is more than double the expenditures in 1989~93.38
The other, more familiar and more controversial BC policy to reallocate resources and redistribute incomes is the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Prior to the Treaty of Rome, the original member countries had very different agricultural policies. With the treaty, however, the national governments agreed to shift responsibility for agricultural policy to a supra-national body. The BC administers the CAP through the Council of Ministers and Parliament, which appropriates money and sets policy. Virtually all agricultural output is covered by the CAP.
The primary aim of the CAP is to raise agricultural incomes. When judged on this goal, the CAP has been largely unsuccessful. Howarth (1990) argues that the redistributive effects of the CAP are regressive for both consumers and farmers, and that large land owners and farmers have tended to benefit the most. 39 Tangermann (1992) notes that over-production has been the most obvious problem, resulting in "butter mountains" and "wine lakes." The CAP has involved heavy public spending, accounting for more than one-half the 1993 BC budget.
Not surprisingly, the CAP has been a continuing source of tension both within and outside the BC. The program illustrates the difficulty of accommodating the interests of different groups in an international agreement. A particular difficulty in reaching any international agreement is the reduction in national sovereignty it entails. For example, the British have been especially reluctant to embrace closer European economic, monetary and political integration because of concerns about national sovereignty. They have repeatedly questioned the transfer of decision-making to Brussels and away from more appropriate, in their view, national, regional or local levels.
38 See Commission of the European Communities (1994) .
39 Howarth (1990) notes that the CAP also has some important international redistributive impacts. It harms agriculture in many developing countries by dumping EC food surpluses on world markets and by raising EC barriers to imports.
IV. Lessons from the U.S. and BC Experiences
The preceding survey of the U.S. and BC integration experiences focuses on the effects of political and other institutional changes on the pace and extent of income convergence among countries and among regions within a country. The evidence supports the hypothesis that changes that enhance integration, by reducing barriers to the flow of goods or resources, will tend to promote per capita income convergence over time. In the U.S., for example, the impediment to significant convergence of southern and non-southern per capita incomes was the isolation of the southern labor market. Only after the 1930s, when various institutional changes resulted in largenumbers of southerners moving north, was there substantial convergence of per capita incomes. Increased barriers, on the other hand, appear to slow or even halt the tendency for convergence. In the European Community, convergence slowed markedly during the l970s and early 1980s with the rise of non-tariff barriers and exchange market instability.
The tendency for the incomes of integrated regions to converge can be disruptedby economic shocks that affect regions differentially, as well as by the imposition of political impediments. In the United States, state per capita incomes have occasionallydiverged for periods as long as a decade. Convergence, partithlarly among regions or countries with very different resource bases and outputs, is thus likely to be protracted. Because high and lowincome countries often differ widely with respect to their resources and outputs, convergence of their incomes is likely to be slow even when the impediments to their integration are significantly reduced.
The U.S. and BC experiences do suggest, however, that increased integration can generate income convergence even when the income levels of the integrating countries or regions are quite disparate. In the U.S. case, in 1880, the first date following the Civil War for which state or regional income data exist, the per capita income of the average of 12 southern states was just 28 percent of the average state income in the rest of the United States. Although Distributional conflicts will inevitably be important to any economic integration agreement. Both the United States and the BC have adopted policies to redistribute income from high to low-income states. In the U.S., a centralized national distribution program attempts to ameliorate distributional conflicts, while in the BC a centralized international distribution program is used. The automatic nature of the fiscal system plays a much larger role in the U.S. than in the BC. Economic and social cohesion is pursued in the BC via the CAP and Structural Funds.
Additional challenges will arise for designing agreements and institutions to handle distributional conflicts from the integration of high and low-income countries. As in the case of NAFTA, in order to placate its low-income workers and protected industries, a high-income participating country will likely provide assistance domestically, and possibly internationally, to those affected adversely by integration. 40 In the absence of a central authority, monetary transfers between the high and low-income countries participating in an integration agreement will likely take the form of the financing of joint projects, rather than explicit transfers as occur within the BC. Under NAFTA, for example, the funding of environmental clean-up ofthe U.S.-Mexico border is primarilythe responsibility of the United States.
From our review of the U.S. and BC experiences were are struckby the extent to which political forces shape the outcome of integration agreements, as well as the use of domestic policies to offset the distributional consequences of increased integration. We are also impressed by the influence of institutional constraints on economic growth, and how institutional changes can affect the convergence of incomes across countries or regions over time. Thus, while we conclude that the evidence from the United States and European Community indicate that integration promotes income convergence, even among high and low-income participants, the nature of integration agreements, and their impact on the extent and pace of convergence, will depend significantly on the institutional environment in which they operate.
40 Thus far, according to Behr (1994) , the U.S. appears to have suffered few job losses from NAFTA compared to the accompanying increase in exports. Through the first six months of NAFTA, 167 U.S. companies with 23,734 workers had requested adjustment assistance. Ofthese requests, 59 had been approved, covering approximately 4800 workers. Department of Labor officials anticipate that not more than 15,000 workers will be affected during the first year of NAFTA. 
